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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an application of a new methodological framework for undertaking distributional cost-effectiveness
analysis to combine the objectives of maximising health and minimising unfair variation in health when evaluating
population health interventions. The National Health Service bowel cancer screening programme introduced in 2006 is
expected to improve population health on average and to worsen population health inequalities associated with deprivation
and ethnicity – a classic case of ‘intervention-generated inequality’. We demonstrate the distributional cost-effectiveness
analysis framework by examining two redesign options for the bowel cancer screening programme: (i) the introduction
of an enhanced targeted reminder aimed at increasing screening uptake in deprived and ethnically diverse neighbourhoods
and (ii) the introduction of a basic universal reminder aimed at increasing screening uptake across the whole population. Our
analysis indicates that the universal reminder is the strategy that maximises population health, while the targeted reminder is the
screening strategy that minimises unfair variation in health. The framework is used to demonstrate how these two objectives can
be traded off against each other, and how alternative social value judgements inﬂuence the assessment of which strategy is best,
including judgements about which dimensions of health variation are considered unfair and judgements about societal levels of
inequality aversion. © 2014 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is used to support health sector decisions about the allocation of limited
resources with the objective of maximising health (Drummond et al., 2005). When dealing with population
health interventions, we often have the additional objective of minimising ‘unfair’ health inequality
(Cookson et al., 2009) and to this end are also interested in the social distribution of both health gains and
health opportunity costs due to the intervention. In this paper, we propose a methodology for quantifying
and combining these two objectives within an economic evaluation framework that highlights the social value
judgements underpinning any particular conclusion. This ‘distributional CEA’ (DCEA) is demonstrated through
a case study comparing potential redesign options to increase uptake of the National Health Service (NHS) bowel
cancer screening programme (BCSP) in England.
Colorectal cancer (CRC) is the third most common cancer in the UK with approximately 40 000 new cases
diagnosed annually resulting in almost 16 000 CRC-related deaths per year (ONS, 2012). Research has shown
that using screening to diagnose and treat CRC earlier can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of CRC deaths
(Hewitson et al., 2008). The Department of Health launched the BCSP in 2006 and currently offers biennial
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screening with guaiac fecal occult blood test (gFOBT) to persons aged 60–74 years. Variable uptake of
screening has been observed among the ﬁrst 2.6 million invitees to the national BCSP, with overall uptake
averaging only 54% ranging from 61% in the least deprived areas to 35% in the most deprived areas, and
showing a similar gradient in terms of small area-based ethnic diversity measures (Logan et al., 2012;
Von Wagner et al., 2011). Furthermore, for those individuals with positive screening results, there is also
evidence of inequality in the uptake of follow-up colonoscopy (Morris et al., 2012). It is reasonable to expect that
these inequalities in the uptake of the screening programme will exacerbate the already unequal distribution of
health in the population, with the screening programme disproportionately beneﬁting more advantaged groups
(for whom uptake is highest) – a classic case of ‘intervention-generated inequality’ (Lorenc et al., 2012).
Prior to the introduction of the BCSP, a number of possible screening options were evaluated to help NHS
decision makers determine whether a screening programme was worthwhile and if so the form that it should
take. To that end, a model was developed to assess the total resource implications and health impacts of
screening by simulating the natural history of CRC and the impact of screening on that natural history
(Tappenden et al., 2007). This model was later reﬁned and updated to reﬂect data emerging from the BCSP
(Whyte et al., 2012; Whyte et al., 2011). In this paper, we build on the latest version of this economic
evaluation model and use it to estimate the distribution of health associated with alternative screening strate-
gies. We then compare these health distributions using our DCEA framework to determine the strategy that best
addresses the dual objectives of maximising health and minimising health inequality. The focus of our analysis
is on the quantity and distribution of health gains related to increased participation in the screening programme;
other potentially competing objectives of screening programmes such as the promotion of informed choice are
not addressed in this paper.
2. METHODS
2.1. Cost-effectiveness analysis
While recognising that in reality there are an almost inﬁnite number of screening strategies that could be
designed, in order to demonstrate the framework, we simplify the comparison by considering four mutually
exclusive options in our analysis:
• ‘No screening’.
• ‘Standard screening’ as implemented in the BCSP in 2006.
• ‘Targeted reminder’: screening plus a targeted enhanced reminder letter (personal GP-signed letter and
tailored information package) sent only to those living in the most income deprived 40% of small areas
(index of multiple deprivation (IMD) 4 and IMD5) and to those living in areas with the highest proportion
of inhabitants from the Indian subcontinent (IS5). This targeted subgroup comprises of approximately
half of the total population invited for screening. The costs of this strategy per person targeted are
estimated to be £7 resulting in an estimated increase in average uptake of gFOBT among the targeted
population of 12%.
• ‘Universal reminder’: screening plus a universal basic reminder letter (sending a GP-endorsed reminder
letter to all eligible patients). The costs of this strategy per person are estimated to be £3.50 resulting in an
estimated increase in average uptake of gFOBT of 6%.
We characterise the alternative reminder strategies in such a way as to ensure that both have approximately
equal additional intervention costs and equal impact on the total screening uptake, while having very different
distributional impacts. Although these reminder strategies are somewhat stylised constructed to highlight the
trade-offs between health improvement and health inequality, the potential costs and increases in uptake
because of the strategies are estimates based on studies of similar interventions (Shankaran et al., 2007;
Hewitson et al., 2011).
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The economic evaluation model follows a cohort of 1 million 30 year olds through their lifetimes (allowing
it to simulate the adenoma–carcinoma sequence) with screening invitations being sent out biennially to individuals
between the ages of 60 and 74 years. The model is run probabilistically to incorporate the uncertainty around the
input parameters.
2.2. Inequality analysis
The CEA allows us to identify which of the strategies maximises total health. In order to extend this analysis to
allow us to evaluate our other key objective, that of minimising unfair health inequality, we require descriptions
of the estimated distributions of health produced by the interventions being compared. To produce these
estimates, we condition the model input parameters on factors associated with inequalities in health and
inequalities in the effect of screening. We then perform subgroup analyses according to these factors in order
to estimate differential cost and health impacts. The health impact per person within each subgroup is scaled by
the size of the subgroup in order to describe the total population distribution of health.
The distribution of changes in health attributed to an intervention are informed not only by the distribution
of the health gains among recipients of the intervention but also by the distribution of health opportunity costs
among those who would have received the displaced activities that the money spent on this intervention would
otherwise have been spent on. These opportunity costs are unlikely to fall in proportion to the intervention costs
or beneﬁts for particular recipients, and those who would otherwise have beneﬁted from the displaced activities
may also include nonrecipients of the intervention.
2.2.1. Estimating a baseline population health distribution. We estimate baseline inequality in the population
distribution of expected lifetime health by extending the economic model to incorporate differential all-cause
mortality rates by level of socioeconomic deprivation in addition to age and gender. As estimates are based
on the Ofﬁce for National Statistics longitudinal study data (ONS, 2007), we map social class groupings to
deprivation measures. We additionally include the differences in morbidity by using health-related quality of
life data by age and gender based on UK norms for EQ-5D (Kind et al., 1999) and further adjust for deprivation
using the differences between life expectancy and disability-free life expectancy as observed in the Ofﬁce for
National Statistics general lifestyle survey (Smith et al., 2010). Using this data in the model, we estimate a
baseline population health distribution in terms of quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE) at birth. As the
ethnic diversity measure that we use in this study is not a variable that is routinely included in the administrative
datasets used to estimate baseline QALE, we assume a baseline QALE adjusted for gender and deprivation that
does not further vary by ethnic diversity.
2.2.2. Estimating the distribution of uptake of the bowel cancer screening programme. Analysis of the pilot
study of the BCSP suggests that screening uptake (the proportion of those invited to screening who participate)
varies by area level deprivation, area level ethnic diversity and gender (Weller, 2009). Area level deprivation is
based on quintile groups of the IMD 2004, and ethnic diversity is derived from area-based quintiles measuring
the proportion of people originating from IS. Signiﬁcant differences in uptake are observed in the data between
all IMD quintile groups and between the most ethnically diverse quintile group (IS5) and the four least
ethnically diverse quintile groups (IS1-4). Area level variables are based on data at lower super output area
level; these are small areas containing approximately 1500 individuals. Multivariate analysis of the pilot study
results provides the independent effect of each characteristic on uptake (Weller, 2009), allowing us to calculate
the average uptake of gFOBT and follow-up colonoscopy for each of our 20 distinct subgroups, comprising all
possible combinations of the two genders, ﬁve deprivation levels and two ethnic diversity levels. We are unable
to estimate the proportion of the population in each of the 20 groups from this data as correlation between
characteristics was not reported. Therefore, for the base case analysis, we simply assume independence in
the distribution of the characteristics. Data from the pilot are used to extrapolate to the population at large by
further assuming that the population in the pilot study is representative of the population in general.
M. ASARIA ET AL.744
© 2014 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Health Econ. 24: 742–754 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
2.2.3. Estimating the distribution of opportunity cost. Additional costs of screening and related downstream
diagnostic and treatment costs come out of a ﬁxed health budget, and the health opportunity cost due to the
disinvestment of these funds from other uses within NHS is assumed to be one quality-adjusted life year
(QALY) per £20 000, in line with current practice in NHS. Owing to the absence of further information on
how these opportunity costs are distributed, in the base case analysis, we assume that they are distributed
equally across all population subgroups. We then perform sensitivity analyses by exploring two extreme
assumptions around the distribution of opportunity cost: ﬁrst, where the entire opportunity cost is borne by
the healthiest of our 20 subgroups (women living in the least deprived and ethnically diverse areas), and
second, where the entire opportunity cost is borne by the least healthy of our 20 subgroups (men living in
the most deprived and ethnically diverse areas).
2.2.4. Assuming all other factors equally distributed. We are able to estimate a modelled distribution of health
net of opportunity costs by incorporating the three sets of adjustments to the model that we have described
previously, namely, the following: (i) the distribution of factors impacting baseline health; (ii) the distribution
of factors impacting screening uptake; and (iii) the distribution of opportunity cost. In so doing, however, we
assume that all other factors in the model remain constant between the different subgroups of interest. In
particular, a key assumption is that CRC incidence and severity levels are equal across the relevant subgroups.
This assumption was made because of data limitations and is supported by limited evidence suggesting that
variation in CRC incidence by social class is small (National Cancer Intelligence Network, 2004).1
2.2.5. Measuring inequality in the resulting health distributions. Inequality in health distributions can be quan-
tiﬁed in a variety of ways, and we present a battery of measures in order to be able to inform different inequality
concerns from different stakeholders. We start with relative measures of inequality – those that measure the propor-
tional changes in health across the distribution. These range from simplemeasures focusing only on the extremes of
the distribution, such as the relative gap index, to more sophisticated measures assessing the entire distribution and
allowing for different levels of relative inequality aversion. An example of the latter is the Atkinson index, shown in
the succeeding texts for a population of n individuals with hi representing the health of individual i, h representing
mean health in the population and ε representing the level of constant relative inequality aversion (Atkinson, 1970).
Aε ¼ 1 1n
Xn
i¼1
hi
h
 1ε" # 11ε
We also look at absolute measures of inequality – those that measure the absolute changes in health across
the distribution. These also range from simple extreme group measures, such as the absolute gap index, to more
sophisticated measures assessing the entire distribution and allowing for different levels of absolute inequality
aversion. An example of the latter is the Kolm index shown in the succeeding texts with α representing the level
of constant absolute inequality aversion (Kolm, 1976).
Kα ¼ 1α
 
log
1
n
Xn
i¼1
eα hhi½ 
 !
2.3. Social welfare analysis
Having separately quantiﬁed average population health and the level of health inequality resulting from each of
our four screening strategies, we next combine concerns for maximising population health and concerns for
1Note that the stage of detection will be on average later in those groups with lower uptake, and so modelled cancer-related mortality does
differ between subgroups.
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minimising health inequality using social welfare analysis. We ﬁrst check for distributional dominance in a
very general sense using the idea of generalised Lorenz dominance (Shorrocks, 1983) to compare the estimated
health distributions and eliminate dominated strategies. Health distribution A can be said to generalised Lorenz
dominate health distribution B if the Lorenz curve for health in A multiplied by the mean level of health in A
dominates the Lorenz curve for health in B multiplied by the mean level of health in B. To compare the
remaining, nondominated strategies, we turn to more restricted social welfare indices that explicitly trade-off
increases in the mean health against greater equality in the distribution of health (Wagstaff, 2002). These indi-
ces are calibrated on the same scale by calculating an ‘equally distributed equivalent’ (EDE) level of health for
the health distribution: the level of health each person in the population would receive in a hypothetically per-
fectly equal health distribution such that society would be indifferent between that equal distribution of health
and the actual unequal distribution of health. We focus on two such social welfare indices constructed by com-
bining the mean level of health with the Atkinson and Kolm inequality indices, respectively.
hede ¼ 1 Aεð Þh
hede ¼ h Kα
In the case of no concern for inequality (α= ε= 0), the social welfare indices just collapse to the mean level
of health. The difference between mean health and EDE health for a given level of inequality aversion indicates
the average decrement in health per person society is willing to sacriﬁce in order to achieve a perfectly equal
distribution of health conditional on the level of inequality in the current health distribution. Calculating and
comparing the EDEs for the predicted health distributions allows us to rank these strategies over a range of
possible inequality aversion levels.
2.4. Adjustment for alternative social value judgements
If inequality concern does not apply to all sources of variation in health – for example, if some determinants of
individual ill health are deemed to be a matter of unavoidable bad luck or individual responsibility – then
further analysis is required in order to isolate just the variation in health deemed to be unfair.
We can isolate this health distribution of interest by undertaking multivariate analysis on our raw health
distribution, to control for ‘fair’ variation in health in order to leave a distribution of health reﬂecting only
the ‘unfair’ variation. The adjustment process we use here has been referred to as ‘direct unfairness’ in the
literature (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009). This ‘fairness-adjusted’ distribution of health is then evaluated
in place of the unadjusted distribution, using the same inequality and social welfare index approaches. Alterna-
tive judgements about which variation in health is considered fair or unfair can lead to different conclusions as
to which intervention strategy is preferred, and so the sensitivity of the decision to alternative sets of reasonable
social value judgements regarding fairness should be assessed. In the current case study, the social variables of
interest are gender, area-based level of deprivation and area-based ethnic diversity. There are eight possible
permutations of social value judgements we can make on whether or not each of these three social variables
represents a fair or unfair source of variation in health, ranging from all three being deemed unfair to all three
being deemed fair (resulting in the trivial case where there is no variation in health in the adjusted distribution).
For our base case analysis, we characterise all variation in health as unfair. We then check the sensitivity of
the ranking of strategies to each of the other seven possible social value judgements that can be made in this
example. To apply these alternative social value judgements, we adjust our health distribution to only reﬂect
unfair variation in health by using reference values for the fair variables while preserving the actual values
for the unfair variables.
In cases where dominance rules, such as generalised Lorenz dominance, do not provide a complete ordering
of strategies, additional social value judgements are required to assess trade-offs between improving total
population health and reducing unfair health inequality. The key additional social value judgements that need
to be made relate to the choice of inequality measures underpinning social welfare and the level of inequality
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aversion. We calculate our results for relative (Atkinson) and absolute (Kolm) inequality indices at both high
and low levels of inequality aversion and check the sensitivity of our decision across a range of inequality
aversion levels in order to identify the thresholds at which each strategy would be preferred.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Cost-effectiveness results
Table I shows the population level cost-effectiveness results for the four different strategies. The results are
based on a lifetime model of a cohort of 1 million 30 year olds, and net health beneﬁts are calculated at a
cost-effectiveness threshold of £20 000 per QALY.
The screening programme in any form improves population health and has positive net health beneﬁts as
compared with no screening. On the basis of these cost-effectiveness results, if the objective is solely to
maximise population health, we should choose screening with the addition of the universal reminder.
3.2. Inequality results
The baseline distribution of health measured in QALE is shown in Figure 1. We can see from this distribution that
in the absence of any screening programme, there are substantial inequalities in the population health distribution.
We next look at the impact of the three screening options on this baseline health distribution. Figure 2 shows
the impact of each option in terms of screening uptake by baseline population health. Figure 3 shows how
uptake translates into changes in the health distribution.
It is evident from Figure 2 that there is a positive monotonic relationship between baseline health and
gFOBT uptake, with uptake being higher for those who are already more healthy, regardless of the speciﬁc
form of the screening programme under consideration. The universal reminder results in a parallel shift in
gFOBT uptake as compared with the standard screening programme, with uptake increasing by the same
amount (6%) in each health quintile. The targeted reminder ﬂattens the uptake gradient between the health
quintiles, resulting in a higher uptake in the lower health quintiles and a lower uptake in the higher health
quintiles as compared with the universal reminder strategy.
Figure 3a shows the changes to the population health distribution associated with each of our three screening
strategies relative to no screening, and Figure 3b looks more closely at the impact of the two redesign strategies
as compared with the standard screening programme.
Compared with no screening, the screening programme in any of the three forms improves health across the
distribution and widens health inequality in absolute terms, improving the health of the healthiest most and the
least healthy least. Looking to Figure 3b, we see that compared with standard screening, the universal reminder
is health improving across the distribution and further exacerbates absolute health inequality. By contrast, the
targeted reminder as compared with standard screening reduces absolute health inequality by focussing
additional beneﬁts on the least healthy. It also reduces the health of some of the more healthy groups who beneﬁt
very little from the targeted reminder but still bear the health losses because of the opportunity cost of the strategy.
Table I. Standard cost-effectiveness results
Bowel cancer-related
cost (£) Life years QALYs
Incremental net health
beneﬁt (QALYs)a
No screening 278 793 874 50 577 384 41 762 818 —
Standard screening 350 872 069 50 634 273 41 806 794 40 372
Screening + targeted reminder 400 936 962 50 639 192 41 810 506 41 581
Screening + universal reminder 385 268 692 50 639 452 41 810 784 42 642
Results based on a lifetime model for a cohort comprising of 1 million 30 year olds.
aIncremental to no screening.
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Combining the baseline health distribution and the estimated distribution of health changes associated with
each of our screening strategies provides the overall health distribution associated with each strategy. Table II
reports a range of absolute and relative inequality measures calculated for each strategy.
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All relative and absolute inequality measures calculated across a range of inequality aversion levels rank no
screening as the least unequal and the universal reminder as the most unequal of the four strategies.
3.3. Social welfare results
We next combine our concerns for maximising health and minimising health inequality using social welfare
analysis. We ﬁnd that the estimated health distributions associated with both no screening and standard
screening are generalised Lorenz dominated by those associated targeted and universal reminder strategies.
This implies that both reminder strategies deliver more population health on average and a fairer distribution
of health than the dominated strategies. Dominance does not apply between the targeted and universal reminder
strategies, however, so we turn to our social welfare indices evaluated across a range of inequality aversion
levels. The values of these indices are reported in Table III.
The social welfare indices show that where there is little or no concern for inequality, the universal reminder
is the preferred strategy. However, as inequality aversion increases, the targeted reminder becomes the
preferred strategy.
The results thus far have assumed an equal distribution of opportunity cost. Table IV reports the sensitivity
of these results to alternative extreme assumptions. When all opportunity costs are borne by the least healthy
subgroup, no screening and standard screening are no longer dominated.
Although the distribution of opportunity cost does not impact mean health, it does impact the distribution of
health, and this is reﬂected in the social welfare measures. This is particularly evident at intermediate levels of
Table II. Measures of inequality
Relative inequality indices No screening Standard Targeted reminder Universal reminder
Relative gap index (ratio) 0.17527a 0.17592 0.17586 0.17596
Relative index of inequality 0.18607a 0.18674 0.18668 0.18678
Gini index 0.03101a 0.03112 0.03111 0.03113
Atkinson index (ε= 1) 0.00171a 0.00172 0.00172 0.00172
Atkinson index (ε= 7) 0.01330a 0.01337 0.01337 0.01338
Atkinson index (ε= 30) 0.06253a 0.06281 0.06279 0.06283
Absolute inequality indices No screening Standard Targeted reminder Universal reminder
Absolute gap index (range) 10.98604a 11.03064 11.02726 11.03325
Slope index of inequality 12.88747a 12.94123 12.93691 12.94438
Kolm index (α= 0.025) 0.20281a 0.20430 0.20416 0.20439
Kolm index (α= 0.1) 0.87801a 0.88429 0.88371 0.88467
Kolm index (α= 0.5) 4.56391a 4.58739 4.58587 4.58883
ε= 1 represents low relative inequality aversion, while ε= 30 represents high relative inequality aversion.
α= 0.025 represents low absolute inequality aversion, while α= 0.5 represents high absolute inequality aversion.
aIndicates the most equal strategy.
Table III. Measures of social welfare
Social welfare indices Targeted reminder Universal reminder
Mean health (ε= α=0) 69.30127 69.30233a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 1) 69.18238 69.18331a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 7) 68.37503 68.37510a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 30) 64.94991a 64.94796
Kolm EDE (α= 0.025) 69.09711 69.09794a
Kolm EDE (α= 0.1) 68.41756 68.41767a
Kolm EDE (α= 0.5) 64.71541a 64.71350
EDE, equally distributed equivalent.
aIndicates the strategy yielding the highest social welfare.
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inequality aversion (ε = 7 or α= 0.1) where we see that the preferred screening strategy changes from standard
screening when all the opportunity cost is borne by the least healthy group, to universal reminder when
opportunity cost is equally distributed, to targeted reminder where all the opportunity cost is borne by the
healthiest group.
3.4. Adjustment for alternative social value judgements results
Our results so far have assumed all inequality is unfair; Table V reports the sensitivity of our results to all
eight possible sets of social value judgements regarding which inequalities are deemed unfair that can be
made in this example.
The sensitivity analysis suggests that in this example, value judgements around the fairness of variation
associated with area level deprivation are pivotal in determining the preferred strategy.
Finally, we explore the sensitivity of our social welfare indices calculated for the nondominated strategies to
the choice of inequality aversion level as shown in Figure 4a and b. These ﬁgures show the difference between
the EDE of the alternative strategies. The threshold level of inequality aversion at which the targeted reminder
becomes the preferred strategy is eight for the Atkinson EDE and 0.12 for the Kolm EDE. At these levels of
inequality aversion, a decision maker would be willing to sacriﬁce 1000 potential QALYs among the
population of 1 million 30 year olds in order to achieve the more equal distribution of health offered by the
targeted screening strategy.
Table IV. Sensitivity to opportunity cost distribution
All opportunity cost borne by least
healthy subgroup
All opportunity cost borne by
healthiest subgroup
Social welfare indices
No
screening Standard
Targeted
reminder
Universal
reminder
Targeted
reminder
Universal
reminder
Mean health 69.25969 69.30006 69.30127 69.30233a 69.30127 69.30233a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 1) 69.14152 69.18056 69.18147 69.18252a 69.18286 69.18373a
Atkinson EDE (ε= 7) 68.33888 68.36800a 68.36610 68.36734 68.37799a 68.37769
Atkinson EDE (ε=30) 64.92865a 64.91468 64.89302 64.89892 64.95627a 64.95350
Kolm EDE (α= 0.025) 69.05688 69.09486 69.09556 69.09660a 69.09793 69.09866a
Kolm EDE (α= 0.1) 68.38168 68.41112a 68.40958 68.41074 68.42046a 68.42020
Kolm EDE (α= 0.5) 64.69578a 64.68086 64.65951 64.66532 64.72148a 64.71879
EDE, equally distributed equivalent.
aIndicates the strategy yielding the highest social welfare.
Table V. Sensitivity of preferred screening strategy decision to the choice of social value judgements
Social value judgment Preferred strategy based on social welfare index
IMD
Ethnic
diversity Gender
Atkinson
EDE (ε= 1)
Atkinson
EDE (ε= 7)
Atkinson EDE
(ε= 30)
Kolm EDE
(α= 0.025)
Kolm EDE
(α= 0.1)
Kolm EDE
(α= 0.5)
Fair Fair Fair U U U U U U
Fair Unfair Fair U U U U U U
Fair Fair Unfair U U U U U U
Fair Unfair Unfair U U U U U U
Unfair Fair Fair U U T U U T
Unfair Unfair Fair U U T U U T
Unfair Fair Unfair U U T U U T
Unfair Unfair Unfair U U T U U T
IMD, index of multiple deprivation; EDE, equally distributed equivalent; U, universal reminder; T, targeted reminder.
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4. DISCUSSION
4.1. Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis
The results from the model show that although the national BCSP has a small per person beneﬁt, this beneﬁt is sub-
stantial at a population level. This is to be expected for a population health intervention such as this, where the ma-
jority of people screened will not have bowel cancer, and some of the people who develop bowel cancer may not
participate in screening. So despite large individual beneﬁts accruing to people who participate in screening and
have their bowel cancer detected early, these beneﬁts accrue to only a relatively small number of people and are
averaged across the whole population, giving a small expected per person beneﬁt among the general population.
Targeted and universal reminder strategies to increase uptake of bowel cancer screening both appear to be worth-
while in terms of improving population health. In the base case analysis, both would be viewed as welfare increasing
compared with no screening or standard screening for a broad range of social welfare functions reﬂecting different
views on health inequality. The universal reminder resulted in a greater population health improvement than the
targeted reminder but was less attractive in terms of its impact on increasing health inequalities. In our base case anal-
ysis, the universal reminder would be the preferred intervention at the lower end of the range of inequality aversion
values considered, but the targeted reminder could become preferred at high levels of health inequality aversion.
Although all three conﬁgurations of the screening programme are health inequality increasing compared
with no screening, augmenting the current screening programme with a targeted reminder reduces health
inequality. By contrast, augmenting the current screening programme with a universal reminder slightly
increases health inequality as compared with the standard screening programme alone. Some aspects of the inter-
vention-generated inequality due to the screening programme arise because of inequalities in uptake of gFOBT and
follow-up colonoscopy. However, some of the health inequality impact arises through differing rates of morbidity
and other-cause mortality (not related to bowel cancer directly). Because we are interested in lifetime health, as
measured here using QALE, detecting cancer earlier and thereby preventing a cancer-related fatality will inevitably
deliver a larger health gain in social groups with relatively high QALE (Hauck et al., 2002).
4.2. Sensitivity analyses
No screening and standard screening could be ruled out on the basis of generalised Lorenz dominance, but this
was sensitive to an assumption about the distribution of the opportunity cost. The ranking produced by social
welfare indices was sensitive to the type and level of inequality aversion. Furthermore, alternative social value
judgements about the fairness of variation associated with the different population characteristics impact our
choice of preferred strategy.
4.3. Other approaches
A number of methods have previously been proposed in the literature for including health inequality concerns
in economic evaluation. These typically involve either weighting health gains differently for different groups in
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the population (Nord et al., 1999) or weighting overall health gains directly against overall changes in health in-
equality in the context of ‘multicriteria decision analysis’ (Baltussen and Niessen, 2006). Both these types of
method can be replicated using the DCEA framework by imposing the relevant restrictions on the fairness adjust-
ment process and on the form and parameters of the social welfare function. We therefore see DCEA as
encompassing these previous equity weighting methods within a more general framework that provides decision
makers with more detailed information about health inequality impacts, rather than as a rival alternative approach.
An important emerging source of empirical literature on incorporating health inequality impacts into economic
evaluation in low and middle income countries is the ‘extended CEA’ framework (Verguet et al., 2014). This
approach is similar in spirit to DCEA, although simpliﬁes the analysis by (i) focusing on a single distributional
variable (wealth quintile group) rather than analysing multiple distributional variables, (ii) setting aside the issue
of opportunity costs falling on the health budget by assuming the intervention is funded by the tax system, and
(iii) presenting results as a disaggregated ‘dashboard’ of costs and consequences by social group rather than using
inequality indices and social welfare functions to explicitly analyse trade-offs between improving health and
reducing unfair health inequality.
4.4. Conclusion
The DCEA framework outlined in this paper demonstrates how concerns for unfair health inequality can be
taken into account when evaluating health care interventions funded within a ﬁxed health budget. Transparency
about value judgements and sensitivity analysis to reﬂect alternative value judgements is a key feature of the
proposed framework. This form of analysis is particularly relevant when considering redesign options for pre-
ventive health care programmes to ameliorate intervention-generated inequalities, as in the case of the NHS
BCSP. Data requirements for such analyses are nontrivial. However, credible DCEAs are currently feasible
in at least some real-world settings, and further analyses will become possible in future as more evidence on
distributional outcomes starts to emerge in the era of ‘big data’. Evidence on distributional outcomes can be
obtained through evidence synthesis research exploiting networks of patient-level trial datasets, as well as
the application of heterogeneous treatment effect estimators to large observational datasets. Research is needed,
for example, to synthesise evidence on the social distribution of the effects of different approaches for increas-
ing the uptake of screening and other forms of preventive care, with a view to gauging how far estimates can be
generalised from one setting to another. More empirical work is also required to determine a realistic distribu-
tion of opportunity costs (plausibly reﬂecting the impact of likely disinvestment decisions in the health service)
and to elicit reasonable ranges of values for societal levels of absolute and relative inequality aversion as well as
social value judgements on what should be deemed as fair and unfair variations in health.
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